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WHEN HARRY MET LAWRENCE:                                  
ALLOWING GAYS AND LESBIANS TO ADOPT 
Nicole M. Shkedi ∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Lawrence v. Texas1 may have paved the way for gays and lesbians 
to experience the joys of parenthood.  From the halls of equality the 
light of parenthood may now finally shine on everyone, regardless of 
their sexuality.  It may no longer be constitutionally acceptable to 
burden gays and lesbians with the obligations of legal custody while 
simultaneously denying them the rights of adoption. 
While courts allegedly inquire into the best interests of a child 
when determining whether to grant adoption,2 children across the 
nation are being denied committed loving homes under the pretext 
that it is for their own best interest.  Ironically, these pretextual 
reasons pervert the best interests of the child inquiry3 by preventing 
these children from growing up in stable homes with parents 
dedicated and able to provide the necessary elements of a safe and 
happy childhood.4  In some instances, courts that have categorically 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2005, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 1998, Rutgers 
University. 
 1 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 2 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-40 (West 2003) (“In the selection of adoptive parents 
the standard shall be the best interests of the child.”).  For a discussion of the best 
interests of the child standard, see infra Part II. 
 3 “The law’s unwillingness to recognize and preserve parent-child relationships 
in nontraditional families sacrifices the best interests of children in those families.”  
Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the 
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 
573 (1990). 
 4 See David L. Chambers & Nancy D. Polikoff, Family Law and Gay and Lesbian 
Family Issues in the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 523, 539 (1999) (citing AM. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING: A RESOURCE FOR 
PSYCHOLOGISTS 8 (1995) (concluding, after a thorough review of forty-three 
empirical studies as well as other articles, that “not a single study has found children 
of gay and lesbian parents to be disadvantaged in any significant respect relative to 
children of heterosexual parents”)).  For other results from studies performed, see 
Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the 
United States and Europe, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2004, 2011 n.52 (2003) (rejecting the 
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denied adoption by gays and lesbians have, in other cases, considered 
the application for adoption by “substance abusers and perpetrators 
of domestic violence.”5  Given such inconsistencies, animosity towards 
gays and lesbians seems to be the only rationale for denying a child 
the benefits of a stable home environment with functional parents 
with whom the child has already developed strong emotional 
attachments. 
In Lawrence, the United States Supreme Court departed from 
traditional Supreme Court jurisprudence and overturned the 
relatively recent decision of Bowers v. Hardwick,6 which upheld a 
Georgia law that made it a criminal violation to engage in sodomy.7  
The Lawrence Court struck down a Texas law criminalizing conduct 
similar to that at issue in Bowers and expressly overruled Bowers.8  The 
majority relied on Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process 
analysis, while the concurrence engaged in a Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection discussion.9  Both opinions ultimately found for the 
defendants, gay men involved in intimate relationships.10 
This decision announces a shift in policy by the Supreme Court, 
a shift that appears to be more tolerant of gay and lesbian lifestyle 
 
notion that same-sex partners are not as qualified as opposite-sex parents) (citing 
Norman Anderssen et al., Outcomes for Children with Lesbian or Gay Parents: A Review of 
Studies from 1978 to 2000, 43 SCANDINAVIAN J. PSYCHOL. 335, 343, 349 (2002) 
(surveying twenty-three studies of children raised by lesbian mothers or gay fathers, 
all of which demonstrate that such children display no psychological or cognitive 
differences relative to other children); Susan Golombok et al., Children with Lesbian 
Parents: A Community Study, 39 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 20, 27-30 (2003) (finding 
positive parent-child relationships and well-adjusted emotional development in 
children raised by lesbian couples relative to those raised by two heterosexual 
parents or by single heterosexual mothers); Ellen C. Perrin et al., Technical Report: 
Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 109 PEDIATRICS 341 (2002) 
(noting evidence that children with gay or lesbian parents are no different 
emotionally, socially, or psychologically than children with heterosexual parents)).  
See also Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1194 (Ala. 1998) (stating that studies have 
“determined that there is generally no significant difference in various factors 
between a child who has been reared by a heterosexual couple and one who has 
been reared by a homosexual couple”). 
 5 Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1385 n.18 (S.D. Fla. 2001); See Ward v. 
Ward, 742 So. 2d 250, 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (reversing custody from lesbian 
mother to child’s father who had been convicted of the second-degree murder of his 
first wife for which he served eight years in prison). 
 6 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 7 Id. 
 8 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 9 Id. at 579. 
 10 Id. at 579, 585. 
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and conduct.  But, does the shift signify an opportunity for gays and 
lesbians to convince the Court to apply a heightened level of 
scrutiny?  Or at least adopt the more searching rational basis with 
“bite”11 standard of review in the context of adoption? 
This Comment discusses the possible effects of the Lawrence 
decision, specifically focusing on the potential applications to state 
laws and policies precluding adoption by gays and lesbians.  
Significantly, the movement in the United States is leading toward 
more widespread acceptance of gay and lesbian parents.  That 
acceptance has become increasingly apparent in the fact that 
approximately one-half of the nation’s courts now are increasingly 
granting custody and visitation rights to such parents.12  However, 
with approximately one-half of the states continuing to refuse to 
allow same-sex partners to adopt the children of their partners,13 gays 
and lesbians still have obstacles to confront.14  The Lawrence decision 
may provide significant ammunition for their fight. 
Part II discusses the general law of adoption around the country, 
specifically addressing court standards used to determine whether or 
 
 11 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 659-62 (2d 
ed. 2002).  Chemerinsky explains that under traditional rational basis review, the 
court will tolerate substantial underinclusiveness; however, when the Court looks 
more deeply into the government’s purported interest to find “nothing other than 
irrational prejudices,” it would “appear[] that there was more ‘bite’ to the Court’s 
approach than usual for this level of scrutiny.”  Id.  For examples of cases where the 
Court evaluated, under rational basis with “bite” review, a law classifying gays and 
lesbians, see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (finding that the only apparent 
reason for an amendment to the Colorado State Constitution that singled out gays 
and lesbians for the denial of specific legal protection from discrimination was 
“animosity toward the class of persons affected”) and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that a city ordinance requiring a special 
permit to operate a group home for the mentally disabled when no such a permit 
was required for the operation of any other group facility served no rational purpose 
and thus, failed even rational basis review). 
 12 See Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82 (Tenn. 2001) (reinstating trial court’s 
order allowing lesbian unrestricted overnight visitation with the couple’s older 
child); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000) (enforcing a visitation 
agreement between lesbian partners after the couple split up). 
 13 The most common way for a same-sex partner to request to adopt the child of 
his or her partner is to urge the court to extend a stepparent exception to reach 
same-sex partners.  A stepparent exception allows a non-biological parent to adopt 
the child of his or her spouse without requiring the parent spouse to terminate 
existing rights over the child.  Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: 
Courts, Legislatures and Second-Parent Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933, 937 (2000). 
 14 See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund’s, Overview of State Adoption 
Laws [hereinafter Lambda Legal, State Adoption Laws], at http:// 
www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=399 (Aug. 27, 2002). 
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not to grant adoption and the arguments against granting adoption 
to certain applicants.  This part then addresses the statutes and 
policies of certain states that prevent gays and lesbians from 
adopting.  For example, states such as Florida, Mississippi, and Utah 
expressly prohibit adoption by gays and lesbians,15 while other states 
utilize their court systems to effectively restrict the options available 
to gays and lesbians with respect to adoption.16  Despite recent trends 
to the contrary, many courts across the nation exhibit general 
hostility toward gay and lesbian parents by adversely considering the 
sexuality of the parent when determining whether to grant custodial 
or visitation rights.17  Even more widespread, however, is the 
unwillingness of courts to extend a stepparent exception to same-sex 
partners.18  This tendency occurs even in states that are generally 
 
 15 FLA. STAT. ch. 63.042(3) (2003) (expressly prohibiting adoption by a 
“homosexual”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (2003) (expressly prohibiting adoption by 
same-sex couples); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3)(b) (2003) (prohibiting adoption by 
unmarried individuals residing with, and sexually involved with, another person). 
 16 For a more detailed analysis of the adoption laws of individual states with 
respect to gays and lesbians, see infra Part II.  See also Lambda Legal, State Adoption 
Laws, supra note 14. 
 17 See Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d at 1194 (affirming the trial court’s modification 
of custody agreement based on the “change in the mother’s homosexual 
relationship, from a discreet affair to the creation of an openly homosexual home 
environment”); Larson v. Larson, 902 S.W.2d 254 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming 
trial court’s order changing primary custody based partially on lesbian mother’s 
open relationship with same-sex partner); Morris v. Morris, 783 So. 2d 681 (Miss. 
2001) (holding that although it may not be the sole factor, adverse consideration of 
gay or lesbian orientation is permitted in custody disputes); Pulliam v. Smith, 501 
S.E.2d 898, 901-02 (N.C. 1998) (affirming the trial court’s modification of custody 
agreement based on finding that due to the father’s homosexuality, the mother was 
the “fit and proper person to exercise the exclusive care, custody and control of 
the . . . children”).  But see Downey v. Muffley, 767 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2002) (holding that “homosexuality standing alone without evidence of any adverse 
effect upon the welfare of the child does not render the homosexual parent unfit as 
a matter of law to have custody of the child”); Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581 
(Miss. 1999) (reversing order banning visitation between gay father and his child in 
the presence of father’s same-sex partner). 
 18 See In re Adoption of T.K.J. and K.A.K., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) 
(rejecting adoption applications by lesbian partners to adopt each other’s natural 
children); In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374 (Neb. 2002) (denying adoption 
by same-sex partner by refusing to extend stepparent exception to same-sex partner 
and requiring the biological parent to relinquish existing rights in order for the 
child to become eligible for adoption); In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 
1073 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the stepparent exception did not apply to 
same-sex partners); In re Lace, 516 N.W.2d 678, 683 n.8 (Wis. 1994) (finding that 
while the adoption was in the best interests of the child, the stepparent exception did 
not apply to same-sex partners because the biological parent must terminate existing 
rights in order for the child to be eligible for adoption).  But see In re M.M.D. & 
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tolerant of, or favorable toward, gay and lesbian parents in custody or 
visitation cases.19 
Part III of this Comment analyzes the Lawrence decision.  This 
part details the Court’s reliance on substantive due process to 
invalidate the Texas anti-sodomy law.  Further, this part focuses on 
the Court’s decision to adopt a broad definition of liberty under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20  Significantly, 
the Court illustrates a willingness to depart from traditional 
substantive due process analysis by addressing both foreign law21 and 
more current trends in American society.22 
Part III also examines the equal protection analysis employed by 
the concurrence to strike down the Texas law.23  Specifically, this part 
focuses on the concurrence’s application of a more searching inquiry 
– even under a rational basis standard of review – into the 
government interests offered by the state in defense of the 
legislation’s classification based on homosexual conduct or 
homosexuality.24  Importantly, the concurrence refused to defer to 
the state and subsequently held that “[a] legislative classification that 
 
B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837, 859 (D.C. 1995) (holding that “unmarried couples, whether 
same-sex or opposite-sex, who are living together in a committed personal 
relationship, are eligible to file petitions for adoption”); In re Adoption of Tammy, 
619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (allowing joint adoption by lesbian partners where one 
was the natural mother of the child); In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 
A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (extending stepparent exception to allow 
lesbian partner to adopt other partner’s biological child); In re Adoption of a Child 
by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993) (finding that adoption by 
biological parent’s same-sex partner was in the best interests of the child); In re 
Jacob, In re Dana, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405 n.4 (N.Y. 1995) (extending stepparent 
exception to same-sex partners on a case-by-case basis); In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B. 
and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272 (Vt. 1993) (holding that “when the family unit is 
comprised of the natural mother and her partner, and the adoption is in the best 
interests of the children, terminating the natural mother’s rights is unreasonable and 
unnecessary”). 
 19 Compare In re Adoption of T.K.J. and K.A.K., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1996) (refusing to allow second-parent adoptions by same-sex partners), with In re 
Marriage of Dorworth, 33 P.3d 1260, 1262 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the 
“court may not restrict parenting time merely because of a parent’s sexual 
orientation”). 
 20 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 21 Id. at 573 (looking at the laws of Great Britain and Ireland as well as those 
promulgated by the European Convention on Human Rights). 
 22 Id. at 572 (referring to “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial 
protection to adult persons deciding how to conduct their lives in matters pertaining 
to sex”). 
 23 Id. at 579-85 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 24 Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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threatens the creation of an underclass . . . cannot be reconciled with 
the Equal Protection Clause.”25  In addition, this part addresses the 
concerns raised by the dissent about the possible future implications 
of both the Court’s holding26 and the Court’s somewhat novel 
approach to substantive due process analysis.27 
Finally, Part IV analyzes the potential implications of the 
Lawrence decision on state laws and policies that prevent gays and 
lesbians from adopting.  Specifically, this part considers the possible 
applications of Lawrence to challenges against those state laws or 
policies under both substantive due process and equal protection.  
Particularly important to this analysis is the trend in American society 
moving toward a greater acceptance of gays and lesbians.  Part of this 
acceptance may include extending to homosexuals those rights 
enjoyed by similarly situated heterosexuals. 
Using the substantive due process analysis employed in Lawrence, 
gays and lesbians may now argue that the expansive definition of 
liberty adopted by the Court encompasses a fundamental right to 
family autonomy broad enough to include even non-traditional 
family units, such as those with same-sex parents.  Additionally, gays 
and lesbians may use the equal protection analysis adopted by Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence, in order to argue for a more searching 
inquiry into the purported state interests offered in support of 
denying gays and lesbians the right to adopt while simultaneously 
granting those same rights to similarly situated heterosexuals.  Even 
though the Court has not yet classified gays and lesbians as a suspect 
class, one can now argue that discriminating adoption laws create an 
underclass which, following Lawrence, should invoke at least a rational 
basis with “bite” review.  The Lawrence Court exhibited a willingness 
to recognize that the fundamental right to privacy is broad enough to 
include even non-traditional lifestyles; the concurrence refused to 
simply defer to states that have enacted laws that discriminate against 
gays and lesbians based in large part on morality.  Thus, Lawrence has 
provided an opportunity for gays and lesbians to petition the Court to 
protect their right to adopt. 
 
 25 Id. at 584 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 
(1982) (Powell, J., concurring)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 26 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 27 Id. at 594-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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II.  ADOPTION 
“Adoption is a creature of statute which endows the adoptive 
parents with all of the legal rights and responsibilities associated with 
parenthood . . . .”28  In the United States, there is no common-law 
right to adopt; instead, adoption has been created by statute,29 so 
individual laws vary from state to state.  Most statutes, however, 
maintain common elements, namely, requiring the consent of certain 
parties, an agency-generated home study of prospective adoptive 
parents, and a finding by the court that the adoption will serve the 
best interests of the child.30 
Additionally, most adoption statutes require the termination of 
any existing parental rights – either voluntarily or by court order – 
before a child can become eligible for adoption.31  For example, a 
New Jersey statute provides: 
Surrender of a child to an approved agency for the purpose of 
adoption . . . is a surrender of parental rights . . . and means the 
permanent end of the relationship and all contact between the 
parent and child . . . [and] shall constitute relinquishment of the 
[] parental rights in or guardianship or custody of the child  
. . . .32 
“Cut-off” provisions33 ensure that the adoptive parents acquire all the 
rights and responsibilities associated with the child.34 
Traditionally, courts viewed adoption as a last resort, granting it 
 
 28 1 JOAN H. HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE 1-1 (2000). 
 29 Schacter, supra note 13, at 936; see In re Jacob, In re Dana, 660 N.E.2d 397, 399 
(N.Y. 1995) (citing In re Eaton, 111 N.E.2d 431, 432 (N.Y. 1953) (describing adoption 
as “solely the creature of . . . statute”)). 
 30 Schacter, supra note 13, at 936 (citation omitted). 
 31 Id. at 936-37.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-50(c)(1) (West 2003) (“The entry of a 
judgment of adoption shall terminate all parental rights and responsibilities of the 
parent towards the adoptive child . . . .”). 
 32 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41(a).  See also, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 6 
(West 2003) (“[A]ll rights, duties and other legal consequences of the natural 
relation of child and parent shall . . . terminate between the child so adopted and his 
natural parents and kindred.”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(a) (Consol. 2003) 
(“After the making of an order of adoption the natural parents of the adoptive 
child . . . shall have no rights over such adoptive child or to his property by descent 
or succession.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.92(2) (West 2003) (“After the order of 
adoption is entered the relationship of parent and child between the adopted person 
and the adopted person’s birth parents . . . shall be completely altered and all the 
rights, duties and other legal consequences of the relationship shall cease to exist.”). 
 33 Schacter, supra note 13, at 936. 
 34 Id. at 937. 
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only when a perfect or near perfect match existed between the child 
and the prospective home.35  Therefore, agencies maintained long 
lists of characteristics that needed to be similar in order to constitute 
a perfect match,36 thus leaving many children without permanent 
homes.37 
More recently, with the growth in number of children awaiting 
placement in private homes, courts have begun to grant adoptions 
with increased frequency.38  Courts now look at each child on a case-
by-case basis, focusing more closely on the best interests of the child 
before the court in order to provide the child with a permanent 
home.39 
A. “Best Interests of the Child” 
“The polestar by which courts . . . around the country have been 
guided is the best interest of the child to be adopted.”40  Protecting 
and promoting the best interests of the child is the fundamental 
concern of all adoption statutes.41  The standard requires the court to 
engage in a careful balancing of numerous factors.42  Many statutes 
 
 35 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 28, § 3.06[1], at 3-40. 
 36 Id.  Personal characteristics including physical attributes, religion, intellectual 
ability and other characteristics were among those factors agencies deemed 
important in determining whether circumstances were ideal for adoption.  Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partners but Not Parents / Recognizing Parents but 
Not Partners: Gay and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and the United States, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. 
J. HUM. RTS. 711, 714-18 (2000) (citing Voluntary Cooperative Information System, 
Analysis of State Child Welfare Data: Survey Data from 1990-1994, available at 
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/dis/vcis/maintoc.htm) (last visited Mar. 12, 
2004). 
 39 Id. 
 40 In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884, 886 (Ohio 1990). 
 41 Polikoff, supra note 3, at 542 (stating that in determining whether or not to 
grant an adoption, courts across the country seek to promote the best interests of the 
child).  See also, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.005 (Michie 1999) (“This chapter shall be 
liberally construed to the end that the best interests of adopted children are 
promoted.”); FLA. STAT. ch. 63.022 (2003) (“It is the intent of the Legislature that in 
every adoption, the best interest of the child should govern and be of foremost 
concern in the court’s determination.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-37 (West 2003) (“This 
act shall be liberally construed to the end that the best interests of children be 
promoted and that the safety of children be of paramount concern.”); N.Y. DOM. 
REL. LAW § 114 (Consol. 2003) (stating that the judge shall grant the adoption “[i]f 
satisfied that the best interests of the adoptive child will be promoted”). 
 42 See generally the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) (listing numerous 
factors to be considered in determining whether adoption is in the best interests of 
the child). 
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set forth specific factors for judges to consider,43 but due to the 
sensitivity and subjectivity of the decision being made, courts evaluate 
the totality of all circumstances to determine what serves the best 
interests of the child before the court.44 
Under the guise of this standard, many courts have refused to 
grant an adoption to gay and lesbian parents.  Indeed, some courts 
have revoked custody from natural parents as a result of gay or 
lesbian conduct.45  For example, the highest state court in Alabama 
found that allowing a gay or lesbian parent to raise a child might 
deprive that child of “extremely valuable developmental experience 
and the opportunity for optimal individual growth and interpersonal 
development.”46  The court further explained that “the degree of 
harm to children from the homosexual conduct of a parent is 
uncertain . . . and the range of potential harm is enormous.”47  Thus, 
the court affirmed the trial court’s order revoking the mother’s 
custody because the mother, by engaging in a homosexual 
relationship with another woman, had “chosen to expose the child 
continuously to a lifestyle that is . . . no[t] moral in the eyes of most 
of [the state’s] citizens.”48 
Similarly, in a custody dispute over two children, the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina found that homosexual activity between the 
children’s father and his same-sex partner “will likely create 
 
 43 The UMDA includes the following provisions: (1) the wishes of the child’s 
parent or parents as to his custody; (2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian; (3) 
the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his 
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest; 
(4) the child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community; and (5) the mental 
and physical health of all individuals involved.  Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 
402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987). 
 44 Schacter, supra note 13, at 942-43 (discussing legislative intent to grant courts 
broad powers to make case by case determinations in deciding what arrangement 
would serve the best interests of the child). 
 45 See cases cited supra note 17.  Custody decisions are available in greater 
number and may provide a good basis for predicting the attitudes and views that gays 
and lesbians will confront when petitioning for adoption.  See Lambda Legal, State 
Adoption Laws, supra note 14. 
 46 Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998).  
 47 Id.  (quoting Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on 
Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 895 (1997)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 48 Id.  (quoting Ex parte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998)) (internal 
quotations omitted).  See also Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) (revoking 
father’s visitation rights because “[t]he father’s continuous exposure of the child to 
his immoral and illicit [homosexual] relationship renders him an unfit and 
improper custodian as a matter of law”). 
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emotional difficulties for the two minor children.”49  The court stated 
further that “the active homosexuality of the [father and his same-sex 
partner] is detrimental to the best interest and welfare of the two 
minor children.”50  Thus, based in large part on the father’s 
homosexuality, the court concluded that the father could not provide 
a “fit and proper environment in which to rear the two minor 
children”51 and therefore affirmed the trial court’s order modifying 
the custody arrangement.52 
Courts have also invoked the best interests of the child standard 
to determine whether or not to grant adoption to a second parent 
when one parent continues to maintain existing parental rights.  
While most states incorporate a cut-off provision within their 
adoption laws, requiring the termination of all existing parental 
rights over the child before the child may become eligible for 
adoption,53 numerous states allow for an exception.  These states 
recognize the reality that in today’s society many adults divorce and 
remarry, thus creating a growing number of families consisting of 
biological parents and stepparents.54  Thus, the exception enables a 
stepparent to become a legal parent of a spouse’s child without 
forcing the parent spouse to relinquish any existing parental rights.55  
Those states that utilize a stepparent exception appreciate “that 
children’s ties to the individuals who actually parent them – or who 
are committed to parenting them – deserve legal protection even if 
those ties are psychologically and socially constructed and not 
biologically rooted . . . .”56 
Although many states provide the means for a stepparent to 
adopt a spouse’s child, courts have been reluctant to extend such 
 
 49 Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898, 902 (N.C. 1998). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 902. 
 52 Id. at 904. 
 53 See supra notes 31-34. 
 54 Stepparent adoptions constitute more than half of all adoptions.  IRA MARK 
ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 1400 (3d ed. 1991). 
 55 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-50(c)(1) (West 2003) (“The entry of a judgment 
of adoption shall terminate all parental rights and responsibilities of the parent 
towards the adoptive child except for a parent who is the spouse of the petitioner . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
 56 Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption and Aspiration: The Uniform Adoption Act, The 
DeBoer-Schmidt Case, and the American Quest for the Ideal Family, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 15, 17 (1995). 
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procedures to same-sex partners.57  With the increased number of 
same-sex couples seeking to raise children together,58 the demand for 
adoption among these couples has grown considerably.59  The most 
common example involves a lesbian couple where one woman 
conceives the child – usually through artificial insemination – during 
the couple’s relationship,60 and the other woman seeks to adopt the 
child, thereby becoming the child’s second legal parent.61 
Stepparent exceptions, however, assume that the existing parent 
and the petitioning parent are married.62  This creates substantial 
difficulty for same-sex partners seeking to adopt one another’s 
children.63  Nonetheless, gays and lesbians have continued to urge 
courts to broadly interpret stepparent exceptions in order to include 
same-sex couples.64  While gays and lesbians have enjoyed positive 
results from some courts, the majority of courts have failed to extend 
the stepparent exception to same-sex partners.65 
B. Statutory Prohibition 
While some courts have, on a case-by-case basis, refused to 
recognize the benefits of legally granting parental rights to an 
individual already in a caring, committed relationship with a 
 
 57 See Lambda Legal, State Adoption Laws, supra note 14 (noting that twenty-six 
states have failed to allow any second-parent adoptions).  See also sources cited supra 
note 18. 
 58 Polikoff, supra note 3, at 465 n.13 (quoting A. Martin, The Planned Lesbian 
and Gay Family: Parenthood and Children 3 (paper delivered to the 1989 Annual 
Meeting of the American Psychological Association, New Orleans) (copy on file at 
The Georgetown Law Journal)).  Dr. Martin stated: 
What has become clear is that the 1980’s have witnessed the emergence 
of an entirely new family structure, unparalleled in human history. For 
the first time ever in any society we know about, gay people in large 
numbers are setting out consciously, deliberately, proudly, openly, to 
bear or adopt children. 
Id. 
 59 Schacter, supra note 13, at 935. 
 60 Other examples include children born to one partner during the course of a 
previous marriage or other heterosexual relationship, or the legal adoption of the 
child by one partner.  Chambers & Polikoff, supra note 4, at 532. 
 61 Schacter, supra note 13, at 935. 
 62 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.03 (Anderson 2003) (setting forth a list 
of those eligible to adopt which includes a married couple and an unmarried 
individual, but not an unmarried couple). 
 63 Polikoff, supra note 3, at 522. 
 64 Schacter, supra note 13, at 935. 
 65 See Lambda Legal, State Adoption Laws, supra note 14; see also sources cited 
supra note 18. 
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partner’s child, the adoption statutes of states such as Florida, 
Mississippi and Utah have gone even further and categorically denied 
adoption rights to gays and lesbians.66  Most notably, a Florida statute 
expressly states that “[n]o person eligible to adopt under this statute 
may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”67  In 2001, in Lofton v. 
Kearney,68 the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida upheld the constitutionality of the law.69  In that case, Steven 
Lofton, Douglas Houghton and other gay foster parents brought a 
lawsuit seeking to make permanent their parental rights over 
children in their care.70  Lofton was a registered nurse raising three 
HIV-positive children for ten years (since their infancy).71  For his 
extraordinary care and dedication to these children, the Children’s 
Home Society awarded Lofton the Outstanding Foster Parenting 
award.72  Upon the freeing of child John Roe for adoption, Lofton 
submitted an application to adopt him.73  Due to his homosexuality, 
however, Lofton was automatically disqualified.74 
This instant disqualification seems even more troubling when 
one views Houghton’s relationship to the child.  Houghton was a 
clinical nurse-specialist raising child John Roe.75  Houghton became 
Roe’s legal guardian when Roe’s biological father, “suffering from 
alcohol and inconsistent employment, voluntarily left him with 
Houghton.”76  Roe was four years old at that time.77  Upon the 
decision of Roe’s biological father to terminate his parental rights, 
Houghton decided to adopt Roe.78  Since Roe was not a ward of the 
state, Houghton followed the procedures for private adoption, which 
required receipt of a “favorable preliminary home study evaluation” 
 
 66 See sources cited supra note 15. 
 67 FLA. STAT. ch. 63.042(3) (2003). 
 68 Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001).  During the writing 
of this Comment, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this 
decision.  Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 
(11th Cir. 2004). 
 69 Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1372. 
 70 Id. at 1375-76. 
 71 Id. at 1375. 
 72 Id.  The Children’s Home Society is a state licensed child placement agency.  
Id. 
 73 Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1375. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1375-76. 
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prior to submitting a petition to the state circuit court.79  However, 
because Houghton was gay, the interviewer refused to grant him a 
favorable home study evaluation.80  Thus, due to his homosexuality, 
the Florida statute automatically precluded Houghton from even 
applying to adopt Roe.81 
Houghton, along with other gay foster parents categorically 
denied the right to adopt, challenged the constitutionality of the 
Florida law.82  The court upheld the law under both substantive due 
process and equal protection analysis.83  First, the court reasoned that 
since there was no fundamental right to adopt or to be adopted, 
there was no fundamental right to apply for adoption.84  Next, the 
court rejected the notion that a relationship between foster parent 
and child “inherently grant[s] . . . a fundamental right to family 
privacy, intimate association and family integrity.”85 
The court then turned its focus to equal protection.  Although 
the court adopted a rational basis standard of review for 
classifications based on homosexuality or homosexual conduct,86 the 
court rejected the first interest offered by the state, that “moral 
disapproval of homosexuality [is] consistent with the legislature[’]s 
right to legislate public morality.”87  The court stated that “the 
government cannot merely justify singling out a group of citizens for 
disfavor simply because it morally disapproves of them.”88  In 
 
 79 Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ch. 63.112(2)(b)). 
 80 Id. (“Houghton was informed that but for his homosexuality . . . he would have 
received a favorable preliminary home study evaluation.”). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 1377. 
 83 Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d. 1380, 1385. 
 84 Id. at 1380 (stating that “adoption is a privilege created by statute and not by 
common law”) (citing In re Palmer’s Adoption, 176 So. 537 (Fla. 1937); Kyees v. 
County Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 600 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1979)). 
 85 Id. at 1379-80 (finding that foster parent-child relationships “do not warrant 
justified expectations of family unit permanency”) (citing Smith v. Org. of Foster 
Families for Equal. and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977)). 
 86 Id. at 1382 & n.14 (citing Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928 (4th Cir. 1996); 
Town of Ball v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 746 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1984); Equal. 
Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997); Ben-
Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (7th 
Cir. 1996); Holmes v. Cal. Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000); Rich v. Sec’y of 
the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 
1994); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). 
 87 Id. at 1382-83 (holding that “moral disapproval of homosexuals or 
homosexuality [does not] serve[] a legitimate state interest”). 
 88 Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d. at 1383. 
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addressing the second interest offered, however, that the provision 
was in the best interests of the state’s children, the court found that 
denying gays and lesbians the right to adopt was rationally related to 
the state’s interest in having its children “raised in a home stabilized 
by marriage, in a family consisting of both a mother and a father.”89  
Thus, the court held that Florida’s “homosexual adoption provision” 
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.90 
Like the Florida law, a Mississippi adoption law expressly denies 
gays and lesbians the right to adopt.91  Specifically, the law prohibits 
“[a]doption by couples of the same gender.”92  What is most 
disturbing about the Mississippi law is that it was passed a mere three 
years ago on July 1, 2000.93  Similarly, a Utah adoption law prohibits 
adoption “by a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a 
legally valid and binding marriage under the laws of [Utah].”94 
These refusals to allow gays and lesbians to adopt effectively 
deny children the numerous rights and benefits associated with 
having parents legally recognized by the courts.95  The child may not 
have access to Social Security and life insurance benefits should a 
parent die or become disabled.96  The child may not have the right to 
sue for the wrongful death of a parent or the right to inherit under 
the rules of intestacy.97  The child may be denied coverage under his 
or her parents’ health insurance policies.98  The child may not have 
the security of financial support from both parents in the event of a 
breakup.99  Additionally, the child’s parents may be denied the right 
to make important decisions in a medical emergency, or be denied 
the right to sue for custody in the event of a split between the 
parents.100  Thus, without the legal protection afforded by adoption, 
 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 1385. 
 91 MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (2003). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3)(b) (2003) (defining “cohabiting” as “residing 
with another person and being involved in a sexual relationship with that person”).  
This law, like Mississippi’s, was just passed in 2000.  Id. 
 95 Polikoff, supra note 38, at 731. 
 96 In re Jacob, In re Dana 660 N.E.2d 397, 399 (N.Y. 1995). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
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both the child and the non-biological parent experience substantial 
risks and disadvantages.  Rather than focusing on the sexual 
orientation of a parent, “[t]he question for these courts should be 
whether the child will receive the added legal, emotional and 
financial benefits that would result from acquiring a second legal (as 
opposed to merely functional) parent.”101 
Although approximately half of the nation’s states view 
homosexuality negatively in the context of granting adoption,102 there 
has been a movement toward greater acceptance of gays and lesbians 
and same-sex couples.103  This trend has become evident in 
mainstream America,104 as well as in some of the highest courts in the 
land.105 
 
 101 Schacter, supra note 13, at 942. 
 102 See Lambda Legal, State Adoption Laws, supra note 14; see also sources cited 
supra note 18. 
 103 See id. 
 104 See Leann Holt & Jennifer W. Sanchez, Gays Wed in Bernalillo, ALBUQUERQUE 
TRIB., Feb. 20, 2004, at A1 (reporting that a county clerk in New Mexico issued 
marriage licenses to approximately sixty-eight same-sex couples); Carolyn Marshall, 
Dozens of Gay Couples Marry in San Francisco Ceremonies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at 
A24 (reporting that the city’s mayor urged the county clerk’s office to issue marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples); Dean E. Murphy, San Francisco Judge Rules Gay Marriages 
Can Continue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2004, at A8 (reporting that “a judge refused to 
block the issuance of same-sex marriage licenses”); Sabrina Tavernise & Thomas 
Crampton, Gay Couples to Be Wed Today in New Paltz, Mayor Declares, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
27, 2004, at B2 (reporting that the mayor of the New York college town “expected to 
marry at least six same-sex couples today, in what appeared to be the first such 
ceremonies in New York State”); David Usborne, Gay with Children, NEW YORK, Nov. 3, 
2003, at 28 (depicting the growing trend of gay adoption in New York City).  But see 
Christine Hauser, California Supreme Court Voids Gay Marriages in San Francisco, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2004 (ruling unanimously that San Francisco officials “overstepped 
their authority in issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples” and voting 5 to 2 to 
void the more than 4,000 licenses that were given to gay and lesbian couples). 
 105 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that denying same-sex couples the right to 
marry violated the Massachusetts Constitution because the state could not show any 
rational basis for the prohibition); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (ruling 
that, pursuant to the Vermont Constitution, same-sex couples were entitled to the 
same benefits and protections afforded opposite-sex, married couples); Baehr v. 
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (finding that the state’s statutory barrier to same-sex 
marriage resulted in unconstitutional discrimination based on sex, thus requiring 
the state to demonstrate a compelling reason for limiting marriage to individuals of 
the opposite sex).  Responding to Lewin, Hawaii amended the Constitution to enable 
the legislature to limit marriage to a man and a woman.  See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 
(2003) (stating that a marriage contract “shall be only between a man and a 
woman . . . ”). 
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III.  THE COURT’S DECISION IN LAWRENCE 
In 2003, the Court departed from traditional Supreme Court 
jurisprudence by overturning a decision rendered less than two 
decades ago.106  In Lawrence v. Texas,107 the Court struck down a Texas 
law that criminalized sodomy and expressly overruled Bowers v. 
Hardwick,108 which had upheld a similar Georgia law.109  In Bowers, the 
respondent Hardwick was charged with violating the Georgia law by 
engaging in sodomy with another male while in the bedroom of his 
own home.110  Since the conduct occurred between two consenting 
males, the Bowers Court narrowed the issue to “whether the Federal 
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to 
engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States 
that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long 
time.”111  The Court found that proscriptions against homosexual 
sodomy had ancient roots,112 and thus, “to claim that a right to engage 
in such conduct is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best, 
facetious.”113  Hardwick claimed, however, that the presumed views of 
a majority that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable 
does not provide a rational basis for the Georgia law.114  The Bowers 
Court responded by asserting that since notions of morality 
constantly provide bases for the law, it would create a heavy burden 
on the courts to invalidate, under the Due Process Clause, all laws 
that represented essentially moral choices.115  Accordingly, the Bowers 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia law.116 
A. The Majority 
In Lawrence, the Court overruled Bowers117 and struck down a 
 
 106 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 107 Id. 
 108 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 109 Id. at 189. 
 110 Id. at 187-88. 
 111 Id. at 190. 
 112 Id. at 192. 
 113 Id. at 194 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
 114 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
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Texas law criminalizing conduct similar to that at issue in Bowers.118  
The Lawrence Court evaluated the Texas law under substantive due 
process analysis.  Rather than declaring a fundamental right to 
engage in homosexual sodomy, however, the Court rooted its 
decision in a broad definition of liberty under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Court has held to 
provide protection to adults in making decisions regarding sexual 
conduct within their private lives.119  First, the Court discussed the 
foundational cases developing the fundamental right to liberty120 and 
ultimately concluded that liberty under the Due Process Clause has 
broad substantive reach.121  The discussion began with Griswold v. 
Connecticut,122 where the Court invalidated a state law that prohibited 
the use of contraceptive drugs or devices and counseling or aiding 
and abetting the use of contraceptives.123  The Griswold Court 
described the protected interest as a right to privacy and placed 
particular emphasis on marriage and the protection afforded to 
married couples within their own bedrooms.124 
The Lawrence Court then explained that Eisenstadt v. Baird125 
expanded the “right to privacy” set forth in Griswold by extending to 
unmarried individuals the right to make certain decisions regarding 
sexual conduct.126  In addressing Griswold, the Eisenstadt Court opined 
that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”127 
Turning next to Roe v. Wade,128 the Lawrence Court asserted that 
“Roe . . . confirmed once more that the protection of liberty under 
the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental 
significance in defining the rights of the person.”129  In Roe, the Court 
addressed a Texas law prohibiting abortion and held that, although a 
 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 572. 
 120 Id. at 564-66. 
 121 Id. at 564. 
 122 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 123 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-65. 
 124 Id. at 565 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485). 
 125 405 U.S. 438 (1972) 
 126 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565. 
 127 Id. (quoting Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453) (emphasis in original). 
 128 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 129 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565. 
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woman’s rights were not absolute, her right to choose to have an 
abortion fell within the purview of the Due Process Clause.130 
Finally, the Lawrence Court pointed to Carey v. Population Services 
International,131 which expanded the right to privacy to include the 
rights of minors.  Carey invalidated a New York law that prohibited the 
sale of contraceptives to minors under the age of sixteen.132  Through 
this analysis of Supreme Court precedent, the Lawrence Court 
ultimately concluded that liberty under the Due Process Clause could 
not be limited to protect the rights of only married adults.133 
Next, the Court analyzed the history and tradition surrounding 
the conduct addressed by the Texas anti-sodomy statute.134  The Court 
examined, and then rejected, the analysis employed in Bowers.135  The 
Lawrence Court chided the Bowers Court for failing to recognize the 
extent of the liberty at stake and for inappropriately narrowing the 
issue presented to “whether the Federal Constitution confers a 
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”136  The 
Court further explained that the Bowers Court misinterpreted the 
historical treatment of laws regarding sodomy.137  Specifically, the 
Court found that the Bowers Court erroneously concluded that 
homosexual sodomy had been condemned throughout the history of 
our country.138 The Lawrence Court expressly noted that historically, 
the laws of this country did not focus specifically on homosexual 
conduct or homosexuality.139  Instead, the Court proposed that 
society condemned sodomy generally, rather than just between 
persons of the same sex.140  The Court explained that anti-sodomy 
laws throughout history were considered applicable to both men and 
women.141  Moreover, anti-sodomy laws were not enforced against 
consenting adults acting in private.142  Instead, such laws aimed at 
 
 130 Id. 
 131 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 132 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 566-71. 
 135 Id. at 566-73. 
 136 Id. at 566. 
 137 Id. at 566-73. 
 138 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567-70. 
 139 Id. at 568. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 568-69. 
 142 Id. at 569-70. 
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protecting any person forced to endure such conduct unwillingly.143  
“[T]he concept of the homosexual as a distinct category of person 
did not emerge until the late 19th century.”144  Further, up until the 
1970s, no state had singled out homosexual conduct for criminal 
prosecution, and since then, only nine have done so.145  Thus, the 
Lawrence Court concluded that the Bowers Court mistakenly 
considered in “religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable 
behavior, and respect for the traditional family” when it 
contemplated the historical legal treatment of homosexual sodomy.146  
Relying on Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,147 
the Lawrence Court held that the majority of a state’s citizens might 
not use political power to impose moral beliefs on all citizens of that 
state through use of criminal power.148  The Court stated, “Our 
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own 
moral code.”149 
Significantly, the Court considered our country’s current 
treatment of intimate relations between persons of the same sex.150  
The Court stated that “[h]istory and tradition are the starting point 
but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process 
inquiry.”151  Focusing on relatively recent laws and traditions in 
American society,152 the Court recognized “an emerging awareness 
that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding 
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”153  In 
addressing the reaction to the Bowers decision, the Court noted that 
the number of states with laws prohibiting sodomy had halved since 
the Bowers decision (from 25 to 13), and those States that continued 
to ban the conduct failed to enforce the laws against consenting 
adults acting in private.154 
Moreover, in the decisions following Bowers, the Court itself has 
 
 143 Id. 
 144 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568 (citations omitted). 
 145 Id. at 570. 
 146 Id. at 571. 
 147 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 148 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 
 149 Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 850). 
 150 Id. at 572. 
 151 Id. at 572 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573. 
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failed to impose the narrow definition of liberty set forth in Bowers.155  
For example, in Casey, the Court emphasized respect for individual 
autonomy in making personal choices and reaffirmed the magnitude 
of liberty under the Due Process Clause.156  The Casey decision 
provided additional support for affording constitutional protection to 
various personal decisions including those related to family 
relationships.157  Furthermore, in Romer v. Evans, the Court 
announced the unconstitutionality of an amendment to the Colorado 
constitution that deprived “persons who were homosexuals, lesbians, 
or bisexual either by ‘orientation, conduct, practices or 
relationships’”158 of protection under state antidiscrimination laws.  
The Romer Court invalidated the amendment on the ground that it 
was “born of animosity toward the class affected” and thus, not 
rationally related to any legitimate government purpose.159 
Recognizing that the decisions in Casey and Romer tested the 
foundations of Bowers,160 the Lawrence Court continued to review other 
sources of criticism.  For example, the Court noted that five separate 
states had refused to follow Bowers in interpreting provisions in their 
own constitutions.161  Additionally, the Court took notice of the 
substantial legal scholarship that disapproved of numerous aspects of 
Bowers’ reasoning.162 
Further, the Court acknowledged recent decisions on similar 
issues by courts outside of the United States.163  Referring to a case 
decided by the European Court of Human Rights that invalidated a 
law in Northern Ireland criminalizing consensual homosexual 
conduct,164 the Court argued that, since the decision by the European 
Court of Human Rights was binding on all members of the Council 
 
 155 Id. at 573-74. 
 156 Id. at 574 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
 157 Id. at 573-74 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851) (emphasis added). 
 158 Id. at 574 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 624). 
 159 Id. (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634). 
 160 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576. 
 161 Id. at 576 (citing Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002); Powell v. State, 
510 S.E.2d 18, 24 (Ga. 1998); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); Campbell 
v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 
S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992)). 
 162 Id. (citing CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION – 
A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 81-84 (1991); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 341-50 
(1992)). 
 163 Id. at 573. 
 164 Id. (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981) P 52). 
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of Europe, the Bowers Court wrongly concluded that Western 
civilization traditionally condemned homosexual sodomy.165  The 
Court also noted that other nations have accepted, as an integral part 
of human freedom, the right of gay and lesbian adults to partake in 
consensual intimate conduct.166 
Thus, for the aforementioned reasons, the Lawrence Court 
overturned Bowers and found that the Texas law criminalizing 
homosexual sodomy unconstitutionally intruded upon the liberties 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.167 
B. Justice O’Connor’s Concurrence 
Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment, but rather than 
relying on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Justice used the Equal Protection Clause to find the Texas law 
unconstitutional.168  Justice O’Connor first established that 
government legislation classifying individuals based on homosexuality 
or homosexual conduct should be scrutinized under rational basis 
review.169  Justice O’Connor then determined, however, that the law’s 
blatant objective to harm gays and lesbians demanded a more 
searching look into the state’s defense of the equal protection 
challenge.170  The Court has “consistently held [] that some 
objectives, such as a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group, are not legitimate state interests.”171  Therefore, Justice 
O’Connor refused to defer to the state and, instead, determined that 
the state merely used the promotion of morality as a pretext for 
animosity towards gays and lesbians.172 
Justice O’Connor further explained that the Court has “been 
 
 165 Id. (noting that at the time of the Dudgeon decision, there were twenty-one 
member nations of the Council of Europe; now there are forty-five). 
 166 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77 (citing Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici 
Curiae at 11-12). 
 167 Id. at 578. 
 168 Id. at 579. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“When a law exhibits such a desire to 
harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form of 
rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 171 Id. (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) (internal 
quotations omitted).  To further support this proposition, Justice O’Connor also 
cited to Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985) and Romer, 517 
U.S. at 632.  Id. 
 172 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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most likely to apply rational basis review to hold a law 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause where, as here, 
the challenged legislation inhibits personal relationships.”173  Justice 
O’Connor asserted that “[m]oral disapproval of this group, like a 
bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to 
satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.”174  
Thus, Justice O’Connor found that the Texas law violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.175 
Finally, although Justice O’Connor found the Texas 
classification unconstitutional, the Justice pointed to a possible 
distinction between this particular legislation and other possible 
legislation that classified individuals on the basis of homosexuality or 
homosexual conduct.176  Justice O’Connor seemed particularly 
concerned with the criminal conviction of gays and lesbians,177 
recognizing the detrimental consequences that would result from 
such a conviction.178  Despite Justice O’Connor’s potential willingness 
to tolerate discrimination under certain circumstances, in this case, 
Justice O’Connor found that the law’s classification of gays and 
lesbians violated the Constitution. 
C. Justice Scalia’s Dissent 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Thomas, dissented.179  Discussing the importance of stare decisis and 
the difficult burden that must be met in order to depart from 
previous decisions, the dissent faulted the Court for overruling the 
Bowers decision.180  Justice Scalia then criticized the Court for 
overruling the ultimate judgment in Bowers, while failing to declare a 
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.181  The dissent 
 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 175 Id. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The Texas statute makes homosexuals 
unequal in the eyes of the law by making particular conduct – and only that conduct 
– subject to criminal sanction.”). 
 176 Id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 177 Id. (“A law branding one class of persons as criminal solely based on the State’s 
moral disapproval of that class and the conduct associated with that class runs 
contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause, under 
any standard of review.”). 
 178 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 179 Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 180 Id. at 586-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 181 Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Though there is discussion of fundamental 
  
2005 COMMENT 895 
 
 
expressed considerable concern for the “massive disruption of the 
current social order . . . [that] the overruling of Bowers entails.”182 
Justice Scalia also rejected the Court’s analysis of the historical 
treatment of sodomy.183  Disagreeing with the Court’s narrow 
approach,184 the dissent, instead, suggested that the appropriate 
inquiry was whether sodomy, rather than homosexual sodomy, had been 
criminalized historically.185 
Next, Justice Scalia chided the Court for relying on current 
trends in American society and more specifically, the societies of 
other nations, thereby departing from traditional substantive due 
process analysis.186  The dissent disputed the notion of relying on an 
emerging awareness within society as a factor in determining the 
constitutionality of a statute and argued that such an awareness does 
not establish a fundamental right.187  Additionally, Justice Scalia 
adamantly rejected the application of foreign trends and laws to 
American laws and asserted that “[c]onstitutional entitlements do not 
spring into existence . . . as the Court seems to believe, because foreign 
nations decriminalize conduct.”188 
Noting the numerous departures from traditional Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, the dissent then accused the Court of 
supporting the “homosexual agenda.”189  The dissent opined that “[i]t 
is clear from this that the Court has taken sides in the culture war, 
departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the 
democratic rules of engagement are observed.”190 
Finally, the dissent expressed concern about the far-reaching 
 
propositions and fundamental decisions, nowhere does the Court’s opinion declare 
that homosexual sodomy is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause . . . .”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 182 Id. at 591 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 183 Id. at 590-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 184 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 591 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 185 Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur Nation has a longstanding history of 
laws prohibiting sodomy in general – regardless of whether it was performed by same-
sex or opposite-sex couples.”) (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94) (emphasis in 
original). 
 186 Id. at 593-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 187 Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 188 Id.  “The Court’s discussion of these foreign views . . . is therefore meaningless 
dicta.  Dangerous dicta, however, since ‘this Court . . . should not impose foreign 
moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.’”  Id. (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 
(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)). 
 189 Id. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 190 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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implications the Court’s holding may potentially have on other laws 
that classify on similar grounds.191  Justice Scalia stated, “This 
reasoning leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage 
to opposite-sex couples.”192 
IV.  USING LAWRENCE TO INVALIDATE PROHIBITIONS ON GAY AND 
LESBIAN ADOPTION 
A. Substantive Due Process 
“In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the 
meaning of liberty must be broad indeed.” 
 – Justice Potter Stewart193 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits state governments from depriving any individual of “life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.”194  In coming to its 
decision, the Lawrence Court deviated substantially from traditional 
substantive due process analysis.  The considerable changes in the 
Court’s analysis may enable gays and lesbians to successfully convince 
the Court to declare that certain liberties pertaining to family, 
ordinarily denied to them, are fundamental.195 
In interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court has proclaimed certain liberties 
“fundamental rights.”196  Once the Court makes such a proclamation, 
the Court analyzes under strict scrutiny any government intrusion 
 
 191 Id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 192 Id. 
 193 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 194 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 195 The Court has already declared a broad right to family autonomy.  See Santosky 
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (articulating that parents have a fundamental right to 
custody of their children); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) 
(recognizing a broad fundamental right to keep a family together that includes an 
extended family); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (acknowledging a 
fundamental right to control the upbringing of one’s children); Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (recognizing the right to marry as a fundamental right); Pierce v. 
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (asserting a fundamental right to control the 
upbringing of one’s children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (broadly 
defining “liberty” to protect basic aspects of family autonomy).  With the current shift 
in substantive due process analysis, the Court may hesitate to find interests offered by 
the government compelling when those interests are rooted in discrimination 
against, and misconceptions of, gays and lesbians. 
 196 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 762. 
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into these fundamental rights.197  Thus, the government must 
“present a compelling interest to justify [the] infringement” as well as 
“show that the law is necessary to achieve [that] objective.”198  Since this 
burden proves extraordinarily difficult to overcome,199 the Court will 
invalidate almost all legislation infringing upon fundamental rights. 
Traditionally, to declare a right fundamental, the Court has 
looked at whether that right was “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition.”200  Accordingly, the Court looks at our 
country’s historical legal and social treatment of the right at issue.201  
Occasionally, the Court will look at the historical treatment of a 
broader right in order to find a more narrow right “deeply rooted” in 
our country’s history.202  Significantly, the Court has employed this 
form of analysis in more recent decisions.203  In Griswold, the Court 
focused on the broad right to privacy in marriage in order to find 
fundamental the more narrow right to use contraceptives.204  
Similarly, in Loving, the Court focused on the broad right to marry in 
order to find fundamental the more narrow right to marry 
interracially.205  The Court has also implied that substantive due 
process should protect rights that ensure conditions favorable to an 
individual’s pursuit of happiness and secure an individual’s right to 
be let alone.206 
Importantly, the Court looks to the Framers’ intent when 
expanding upon the protections guaranteed by the Constitution.207  
 
 197 Id.  Generally, all other rights not deemed fundamental will be analyzed under 
rational basis review.  Id. 
 198 Id. at 767 (emphasis in original). 
 199 Id. at 645 n.17 (citing Professor Gerald Gunther as describing strict scrutiny as 
“strict in theory and fatal in fact.”  Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)). 
 200 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 765 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503).  See also 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (asserting that fundamental rights are 
those “rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people . . .”). 
 201 Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (“Appropriate limits on substantive due process come 
not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful ‘respect for the teachings of 
history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.’”) 
(quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 202 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 765 (discussing “the question of the 
abstraction at which the right is stated”). 
 203 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
 204 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. 
 205 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
 206 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 494. 
 207 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 15-25. 
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The Framers drafted the U.S. Constitution on the fundamental 
underlying premise that individuals enjoy the freedom to choose for 
themselves how to lead their own lives and have “the right to be let 
alone.”208  Furthermore, as Chief Justice John Marshall explained, 
“We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding . . . 
[A] constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and 
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”209  
Thus, while the Court must protect the integrity of the Constitution 
by refraining from acknowledging whimsical shifts in societal 
preferences, the Court must also be willing to incorporate authentic 
changes in American society into its interpretation of which liberties 
the Constitution protects. 
The Lawrence decision illustrated the Court’s acknowledgment 
that such an authentic change is currently occurring in our society.  
The Court’s willingness to recognize that laws may be based upon 
nothing more than animosity borne of stereotypes and 
misconceptions toward gays and lesbians may enable them to 
successfully challenge, under substantive due process, laws denying 
them the fundamental right to family autonomy.210 
In Lawrence, the Court deviated substantially from traditional 
substantive due process analysis.  Most significantly, the Court 
considered the current treatment of intimate relations between 
persons of the same sex.211  The Court asserted that while a look at 
history and tradition should begin a substantive due process inquiry, 
some cases require further analysis.212  Thus, the Court took notice of 
more recent laws and trends in American society.213  The Court 
pointed to an emerging awareness in this country recognizing the 
significant protection provided by the Due Process Clause to the 
private lives of adults, particularly regarding matters pertaining to 
sex.214 
In another divergence from traditional Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, the Court addressed society’s reaction to the Bowers 
 
 208 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 209 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 15-16 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 
(4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819)). 
 210 For a discussion on Justice Scalia’s dissent, see infra Part III C. 
 211 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572. 
 212 Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)). 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
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decision.215  For example, the Court noted that five separate states 
have refused to follow Bowers in interpreting provisions in their own 
state constitutions.216  Additionally, the Court observed a significant 
decrease in the number of states with laws prohibiting sodomy.217  
Furthermore, since Bowers, the Court has failed to apply a narrow 
definition of liberty in substantive due process cases and has, instead, 
adopted a broader view.  For example, in Casey, the Court 
emphasized the breadth of liberty and protected individual autonomy 
in making personal choices.218  Agreeing with Casey, the Lawrence 
Court asserted that “[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek 
autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.”219 
The Court further departed from traditional substantive due 
process analysis by considering alternative authorities, such as legal 
scholarship criticizing the analysis employed in Bowers220 and recent 
decisions on similar issues by foreign courts.221  The Court placed 
particular emphasis on the recognition, by these foreign nations, that 
the right of gay and lesbian adults to engage in consensual intimate 
conduct is “an integral part of human freedom.”222  This reference to 
foreign law in undertaking a substantive due process analysis, 
however, significantly deviated from traditional Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.223  Previously, the Court had restricted fundamental 
 
 215 Id. at 572-76. 
 216 Id. at 576 (citing Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002); Powell v. State, 
510 S.E.2d 18, 24 (Ga. 1998); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); Campbell 
v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 
S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992)). 
 217 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73. 
 218 Id. at 573-74 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851) (“The Casey decision again 
confirmed that our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal 
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child 
rearing, and education.”).  See also, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 624, 634 (finding, under 
rational basis review, that the state’s purported interest in denying persons who were 
“homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexual” protection under state antidiscrimination laws 
was “born of animosity toward the class of persons affected” and thus, not rationally 
related to any legitimate government purpose). 
 219 Id. at 574. 
 220 Id. at 576 (citing CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN 
REVOLUTION – A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 81-84 (1991); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND 
REASON 341-350 (1992)). 
 221 Id. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52 (1981). 
 222 Id. at 576-77 (citing Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae at 11-12). 
 223 “While Congress, as a legislature, may wish to consider the actions of other 
nations on any issue it likes, this Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or 
fashions on Americans.”  Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in denial of certiorari), quoted in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., 
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rights to “those liberties that are deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition.”224 
These significant changes in Supreme Court substantive due 
process analysis provide the opportunity for gays and lesbians to 
convince the Court to broadly define certain fundamental liberties 
pertaining to family ordinarily denied to them.  Because fundamental 
status turns on whether the Court articulates the right broadly or 
narrowly,225 gays and lesbians should urge the Court to determine that 
the fundamental right to privacy includes a broad right to family 
autonomy that includes the unique situation of same-sex couples 
seeking to adopt. 
The concept of privacy contemplates the moral view embracing 
individual autonomy over societal conformity.226  Thus, the Court 
“protect[s] the family because it contributes so powerfully to the 
happiness of the individual, not because of a preference for 
stereotypical households.”227  Specifically, the Court “protect[s] the 
decision whether to have a child because parenthood alters so 
dramatically an individual’s self-definition, not because of 
demographic considerations or the Bible’s command to be fruitful 
and multiply.”228  Thus, the Court should protect the rights of gays 
and lesbians to choose the form and nature of the intimate 
 
dissenting). 
 224 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 765 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).  See also 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (asserting that fundamental rights are 
those “rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people . . .”). 
 225 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 765 (“At a sufficiently general level of 
abstraction, any liberty can be justified as consistent with the nation’s traditions.  At a 
very specific level of abstraction, few nontextual rights would be justified.”).  See also 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72 (explaining that the Bowers Court defined too narrowly 
the right at issue); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188, 199 (majority held that the narrow right to 
engage in homosexual sodomy was not fundamental, while the dissent defined the 
right at issue as the broader, fundamental right to “be let alone”); Moore v. City of 
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 549-50 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (recognizing that 
the Court can only “estimate” what is “deeply rooted” in the Nation’s history and 
traditions and stating that  “[w]hat the deeply rooted traditions of the country are is 
arguable; which of them deserve the protection of the Due Process Clause is even 
more debatable”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486, 527 (1965) (majority 
defined the fundamental right to privacy broad enough to encompass the right to 
marriage, while the dissent defined the right at issue narrowly as the right to use 
contraceptives and thus, not fundamental). 
 226 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 227 Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 228 Id. 
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relationships that would constitute their families.  The fact that these 
relationships may differ from the traditional concept of family should 
not enable states to deny gays and lesbians the freedom to choose for 
themselves.  “[Freedom] to differ is not limited to things that do not 
matter much.  That would be a mere shadow of freedom.  The test of 
its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of 
the existing order.”229  In a society as diverse as ours, there exist many 
ways to conduct relationships, and the richness of these relationships 
will come from “the freedom of an individual [] to choose the form 
and nature of these intensely personal bonds.”230  The decision in 
Lawrence depicts the Court’s understanding of the differences that 
exist in our country as well as the Court’s willingness to define 
fundamental rights broadly in order to protect these diversities.  
Therefore, the Lawrence decision should encourage gays and lesbians 
to urge the Court to recognize the fundamental interest all 
individuals have in controlling the nature of their personal 
relationships with others. 
B. Equal Protection 
“Our Constitution . . . neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.  
In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.” 
  – Justice John Harlan231 
Gays and lesbians looking to become adoptive parents may seek 
protection under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.232  While the Court has previously failed to categorize 
homosexuals as a suspect class,233 the Court’s decisions in Romer234 and 
Lawrence235 depict a move toward recognizing the rampant animosity 
toward those individuals.  Thus, gays and lesbians may be able to 
persuade the Court to rethink its position on the classification of 
homosexuals as a group and the applicable level of scrutiny. 
When engaging in equal protection analysis, the Court evaluates 
 
 229 Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943)). 
 230 Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 231 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 232 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 233 Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1382 (asserting that all circuits to address this issue 
have failed to articulate a suspect class for gays and lesbians). 
 234 Romer, 517 U.S. 620. 
 235 Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
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laws classifying gays and lesbians under the rational basis test.236  
Under rational basis review, the Court will uphold a law if it is 
“rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.”237  Almost always, 
rational basis review results in a loss for the challenger.  This is due in 
large part to the extraordinary deference granted to the government 
under rational basis: 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV permits the states a wide scope of 
discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens 
differently than others.  The constitutional safeguard is offended 
only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the 
achievement of the state’s objective.  State legislatures are 
presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite 
the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.  A 
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts 
reasonably may be conceived to justify it.238 
Despite this enormously deferential standard, the Court has 
recently used rational basis review to strike down laws classifying gays 
and lesbians.239  In Romer, the Court determined that a Colorado 
constitutional amendment furthered no purpose other than 
“animosity toward [gays and lesbians].”240  Therefore, the Court 
refused to accept as rational any of the justifications offered by the 
state.  Likewise, the Lawrence Court invalidated a law that classified 
gays and lesbians.241  Although the Court ultimately employed 
substantive due process analysis, the Court first acknowledged the 
possible invalidity of the Texas law under equal protection.242  
Though citing to Romer, the Court declined to strike down the Texas 
law on equal protection grounds due to fear that a new law might be 
drawn up differently to encompass all individuals while still 
 
 236 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 645-46 (“Rational basis review is the minimum 
level of scrutiny that all laws challenged under equal protection must meet.  All laws 
not subjected to strict or intermediate scrutiny are evaluated under the rational basis 
test.”). 
 237 Id. at 518 (citing Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); U.S. R.R. Ret. 
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 
(1959); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952)) (emphasis in original). 
 238 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961), quoted in CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 11, at 651. 
 239 See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 620; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 240 Romer, 517 U.S. at 634. 
 241 Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
 242 Id. at 574-75. 
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prohibiting the same conduct.243  In choosing to base its analysis in 
substantive due process, the Court recognized that “[e]quality of 
treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct 
protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in 
important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both 
interests.”244  Thus, appreciating the “stigma [that] might remain even 
if [the law] were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection 
reasons,” the Court adopted a substantive due process approach.245 
It was Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion in Lawrence, 
who used rational basis review to invalidate the Texas law.246  Instead 
of merely deferring to the state, Justice O’Connor determined that 
the Texas law demanded “a more searching” inquiry.247  The Justice 
explained that “[w]hen a law exhibits such a desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group, [the Court] ha[s] applied a more 
searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under 
the Equal Protection Clause.”248  Thus, stating that the Court has 
“consistently held [] that some objectives, such as a bare . . . desire to 
harm a politically unpopular group, are not legitimate state 
interests,” Justice O’Connor evaluated the asserted government 
purpose and decided that the state merely used “the promotion of 
morality” as pretext for animosity toward gays and lesbians.249  
Importantly, Justice O’Connor focused on the restraints the Texas 
law placed on “personal relationships,” asserting that the Court 
“ha[s] been most likely to apply rational basis review to hold a law 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause where, as here, 
the challenged legislation inhibits personal relationships.”250 
This recognition of the animosity and prejudice rooted in state 
laws classifying gays and lesbians lends support to them in the fight to 
gain rights within their families.  What could possibly be a more 
“personal relationship” than that between a parent and a child?  
Regarding adoption laws, states argue that classifications are 
 
 243 Id. at 575. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 247 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 
U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) (internal quotations omitted).  To further support this 
proposition, Justice O’Connor also cited to Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. at 446-47, 
and Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-33.  Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 250 Id. 
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necessary to further the best interests of the child.  Numerous studies, 
however, have shown that children raised by gays and lesbians show 
no appreciable differences from children raised by heterosexuals.251  
Moreover, many states, including those that withhold adoption rights 
from gays and lesbians, approve gays and lesbians as foster care 
parents.252  The irony is extraordinary: These states find that having 
gays and lesbians as temporary care-givers serves the best interests of 
the child, but determine that allowing gays and lesbians to become 
full-time legal parents of those children threatens those same 
interests of the child. 
Gays and lesbians seeking to become adoptive parents should 
argue that the laws denying them that opportunity “inhibit[] 
personal relationships.”253  Thus, the Court should find those laws 
unconstitutional even under rational basis review.  As current 
research demonstrates, gays and lesbians are just as capable as 
heterosexuals of providing children with safe and stable homes.254  
“Despite historical views of homosexuality, it is no longer viewed by 
mental health professionals as a disease or disorder.”255  Children 
raised by gay or lesbian parents do not exhibit an increased 
likelihood of becoming gay or lesbian themselves.256  Children with 
gay and lesbian parents do not display any significant differences in 
psychological health from children with heterosexual parents.257  
Children placed with gay or lesbian parents are not subject to 
increased risk of sexual abuse or molestation.258  Most importantly, 
homosexual conduct is no longer subject to criminal punishment.259  
 
 251 See supra note 4. 
 252 See infra Part II B. 
 253 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 254 See supra note 4. 
 255 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 203 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal quotations 
omitted).  The American Psychiatric Association (APA) removed homosexuality from 
its list of mental disorders.  See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, D.S.M. III: 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 281-82, 380 (3d ed. 1980) 
(noting that homosexuality implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability 
or general social or vocational activities). 
 256 Polikoff, supra note 3, at 545.  Further, without the stigma of immorality 
attached to being gay or lesbian, what would be so terrible about a child becoming 
gay or lesbian? 
 257 Id. at 561-67. 
 258 Id. at 545. 
 259 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.  Eliminating the possibility of criminal penalties for 
engaging in homosexual activity removes the stigma of immorality associated with 
such activity. 
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Therefore, any law or policy relying on one of these misconceptions 
as a basis for denying gays or lesbians the right to adopt has failed to 
show even a rational basis for such discrimination. 
Further, many states admit that gays and lesbians serve the best 
interests of the child as temporary parents by approving them as 
foster care parents.260  States cannot offer any rational reason for 
approving gays and lesbians as foster parents and then simultaneously 
denying them the rights and responsibilities of full-time legal parents.  
Only animosity towards gays and lesbians can explain the blatant 
discrimination in which these laws engage.  The Court cannot uphold 
laws that “exhibit[] such a desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group.”261  Thus, even under rational basis review, the Court should 
reject government arguments that denying gays and lesbians the right 
to adopt serves the best interests of the child, and the Court should 
find those laws unconstitutional. 
Alternatively, the Court could label gays and lesbians a suspect 
class, thereby subjecting to strict scrutiny any legislation classifying 
gays and lesbians.262  Under strict scrutiny, the Court will uphold a law 
only “if it is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.”263  
Originally adopting strict scrutiny for those laws that discriminated 
on the basis of race, “[t]he Court[] emphasized that the long history 
of racial discrimination makes it very likely that racial classifications 
will be based on stereotypes and prejudices.”264  In explaining the 
need for strict scrutiny, Chief Justice Burger wrote: “Classifying 
persons according to their race is more likely to reflect racial 
prejudice than legitimate public concerns.”265 
Similarly situated, gays and lesbians could point out that many of 
the reasons used for discriminating against them are also rooted in 
stereotypes and prejudice.266  More and more studies have illustrated 
the breadth of misconceptions relied upon by legislatures and judges 
 
 260 See Lambda Legal, State Adoption Laws, supra note 14. 
 261 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 262 See Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conflict, and the Socialization of Children, 91 
CAL. L. REV. 967, 975 (2003) (“One day, it is fair to speculate, our courts will hold 
that a legal disadvantage based on sexual orientation is a ‘suspect’ classification.”). 
 263 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 519 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200 (1995); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398 (1963)) (emphasis in original). 
 264 Id. at 669. 
 265 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984). 
 266 Polikoff, supra note 3, at 544. 
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in denying gays and lesbians the right to adopt.267  Judges have 
expressed concern that children raised by gay or lesbian parents will 
grow up to be gay268 or emotionally unstable.269  Other judges have 
voiced reservations about subjecting a child to an increased risk of 
sexual abuse or molestation by placing that child with gay or lesbian 
parents.270  The error in these views has been shown by the numerous 
scientific studies disputing and contradicting each of these 
misconceptions.271  Most significant to this discussion, however, is that 
most judges that have viewed homosexuality negatively have focused 
on the criminality of the conduct in which the parent engaged.272  
After Lawrence, this can no longer be a factor in the analysis. 
The sheer magnitude of legal scholars that find it necessary to 
dispute the same misconceptions time and time again illustrates that 
certain views regarding gays and lesbians result from widespread 
stereotypes and prejudices.273  While America did not develop laws 
specifically aimed at same-sex couples until the last third of the 
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twentieth century,274 homosexual conduct has been condemned as 
immoral for centuries.275  This long history of animosity toward gays 
and lesbians “makes it very likely that [such] classifications will be 
based on stereotypes and prejudices.”276  Furthermore, many states 
have asserted the promotion of morality as a state interest supporting 
laws discriminating against gays and lesbians.277  Thus, “[c]lassifying 
persons according to their [sexuality] is more likely to reflect [] 
prejudice than legitimate public concerns.”278  This continuous 
reliance by society on stereotypes and fallacies offers ammunition to 
gays and lesbians looking to persuade the Court to create a suspect 
class. 
Should the Court deem homosexuals a suspect class, any 
legislation or administration of legislation classifying gays and 
lesbians will have to overcome the rigorous hurdles of strict 
scrutiny.279  The Court will demand that the states show a compelling 
governmental interest for the classification and that the interest 
could not be achieved through any less discriminatory means.280  This 
level of scrutiny would prove fatal to almost all state legislation,281 thus 
granting gays and lesbians a huge victory. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Courts purport to serve the best interests of the child. However, 
the families that these children belong to will not change simply 
because a court refuses to recognize one partner as a legal parent.  
These children will continue to live in the same homes as their same-
sex parents, continue to develop relationships with their same-sex 
parents and continue, above all else, to consider their same-sex 
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parents their family.  Any misgivings a court expresses, even in good 
faith, about allowing a gay or lesbian partner to adopt will continue 
to exist despite the lack of legal standing of one parent. 
“The [c]ourts should not confuse what they can and cannot 
do.”282  They cannot stop gays and lesbians from forming families.283  
Instead, “[w]hat courts can do is make individualized determinations 
of the best interests of children in the cases that come before them.  
They should do this free of the ignorance, hatred, [and] prejudice”284 
that underlie society’s stereotypes and misconceptions regarding gays 
and lesbians. 
With the Supreme Court’s recent decisions and the analyses 
employed therein, gays and lesbians may finally have the opportunity 
to end the discrimination and double standards that have plagued 
them throughout the years.  In a society as diverse as this nation’s, 
there exist many ways to conduct relationships.  The strength of those 
relationships comes from the uninhibited ability of an individual to 
choose the form and nature of those personal bonds.  The Lawrence 
decision depicts the Court’s understanding and willingness to protect 
the differences that exist in our country.  Using the substantive due 
process analysis employed in Lawrence, gays and lesbians may now 
argue that the expansive definition of liberty adopted by the Court 
encompasses a fundamental right to family autonomy broad enough 
to include same-sex parents seeking to adopt. 
Likewise, using the equal protection analysis adopted by the 
Lawrence concurrence, gays and lesbians may successfully urge the 
Court to employ a more searching inquiry into the purported state 
interests offered in support of denying gays and lesbians the right to 
adopt while simultaneously granting those same rights to similarly 
situated heterosexuals.  As Justice O’Connor noted, the Court “ha[s] 
been most likely to apply rational basis review to hold a law 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause where . . . the 
challenged legislation inhibits personal relationships.”285 
As depicted by Lawrence, the Court may be ready to acknowledge 
that the fundamental right to privacy is broad enough to include 
even non-traditional lifestyles.  Further, the Court’s recognition that 
the discriminating law would not likely pass equal protection analysis 
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as well as the concurrence’s refusal to simply defer to the state signals 
that the Court may now apply a heightened standard of review to laws 
that discriminate against gays and lesbians based in large part on 
morality.  Thus, the Lawrence Court’s willingness to depart from 
traditional Supreme Court jurisprudence provides encouragement to 
gays and lesbians in their effort to convince the Court to invalidate 
adoption laws and policies denying them the right to adopt. 
 
